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RESTORING RESPONSIBILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN DISASTER RELIEF
JOHN K. WARREN*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, questions regarding the
funding and responsibility for the cleanup operations of natural disas-
ters have become increasingly salient, and will continue to have broad
political, economic, and environmental implications for the foreseeable
future. The considerable economic and environmental2 problems arising
from such disasters will need to be addressed in a clear and concise
manner in order to successfully mitigate their catastrophic effects on the
national landscape. For Hurricane Katrina alone, the Congressional
Budget Office estimates that "damage to homes, government buildings,
oil refineries and businesses will total between $70 billion and $130
billion."3 In addition, the so-called "toxic tide"4 created by the synthetic
mixture of everything from "household paints, deodorants, and old car
* John K. Warren received his B.A. in Political Science with a concentration in Inter-
national Relations from Duke University in 2004. Mr. Warren is a 2007 J.D. candidate at
the College of William & Mary Law School. He would like to thank his parents, Kay and
Phil Warren, for their love and tremendous support throughout his academic career. He
would also like to thank the editorial staff for their dedicated and inexhaustible assis-
tance in the preparation of this Note for publication.
'See Weatherproofing the U.S.: Are We Prepared For Severe Storms?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Env't, Tech., & Standards of the House Comm. on Sci., 107th Cong. 3 (2001)
[hereinafter Weatherproofing the U.S. Hearing] ("Each year, severe weather.., causes
roughly $16 billion in damages.").
2 See H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENV'T, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF COASTAL
HAZARDS 83, tbl. 3.8 (2000) (detailing the "natural resource and ecosystem costs of coastal
hazards and disasters").
3 Andrew Taylor, Gov't Hurricane Tab May Be Below $150B, BREITBART.COM, Oct. 6,2005,
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8D2SHV83&showarticle= 1. See also DAVID
L. JOHNSON, NAT'L WEATHER SERV., NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., SERVICE
ASSESSMENT: HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (2006), available at http://www.weather.gov/om/
assessments/pdfs/Katrina.pdf (stating that the National Hurricane Center has estimated
the total damage at $81.2 billion).
4 Brad Knickerbocker & Patrik Jonsson, New Orleans' Toxic Tide Will Cause Costly
Cleanup, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-07-
katrina-water-cleanup-x.htm.
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batteries to railroad tank cars, sewage treatment plants, and landfills, "'
will further complicate and intensify the already daunting task faced by
state, local, and federal cleanup officials.
Private homeowners face a significant number of obstacles in put-
ting their lives back together, including the recent increase in the number6
and costs' of natural disasters, decreased availability and affordability
of insurance coverage,8 limited supply of federal funds available for clean-
up operations, and patently obvious lack of viable alternative proposals
for tackling pollution on private property. The cumbersome, ineffectual,
and often counterintuitive cycle engendered by current emergency relief
efforts9 creates damaging consequences for many affected communities.
This Note first explores the increasing importance and overall sig-
nificance of natural disaster cleanup operations in the United States from
the perspective of private homeowners.1" Next, it delineates the economic
and bureaucratic structure of modern disaster relief.1 Lastly, this Note ar-
ticulates ways to improve the current system and address the salient issues
that impede the implementation of successful alternatives for realizing
a full and fair economic and environmental recovery for all adversely
affected citizens. 1
2
In confronting the problems wrought by natural disasters, the poli-
tical response has often been one of short-sighted emotional zeal 3 rather
than the cautious, rational approach needed to fashion truly effective solu-
tions. Commentators brave enough to challenge the firmly entrenched,
federally subsidized "cycle of repair and reconstruction"14 have been
5Id.
6 Weatherproofing the U.S. Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (documenting the 250% increase
in the number of dangerous hurricanes between 1995 and 2000 over the number of
dangerous hurricanes between 1971 and 1994).
7 Id. at 3-4.
'See generally Rob Rikoon, Real Money: Katrina Creates Long-Term Misfortune, SANTA
FE NEW MEXICAN, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/32420.html.
9 See DAVID M. BUSH ET AL., LIVING BY THE RULES OF THE SEA 4 (1996) [hereinafter BUSH
ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA].
See infra Part I.
1See infra Parts II-V.
"See infra Parts VI-VIII.
"See James O'Toole, U.S. Help For Disaster Victims Goes From Nothing to Billions,
PIrSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Oct. 2, 2005, httpJ/www.post-gazette.com/pgpp/05275/581271
.stm ("Bush did not put a price tag on any of [the proposed Hurricane Katrina federal relief
efforts]. In a subsequent news conference, he said, 'It will cost what it costs.'").
" Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding PublicAcquisition of Private Property
Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 342 (2003).
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labeled cruel and callous.' 5 One rational solution to this growing problem
couples a firm commitment to expand and strengthen the Superfund"6
with an emphasis on alternative proposals for the private or public
acquisition of polluted or abandoned lands, 7 such as the exercise of
eminent domain (emboldened by the recent Kelo v. City of New London"
Supreme Court decision). This approach would forge a multifaceted and
highly effective resolution for tackling the nation's natural disaster-related
cleanup concerns. Such a proposal, ifimplemented, could successfully address
the problems associated with rising costs, more frequent and more intense
natural disasters, limited availability of funds, and counterintuitive gov-
ernment programs dealing with cleanup costs on privately owned land.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE
A. Increasing Number and Cost of Natural Disasters
With the advent of twenty-four-hour television news networks
and the increasing number and availability of internet news sources, an
impartial observer may believe that natural disasters such as floods and
hurricanes are simply getting more national media coverage rather than
actually growing in number and severity. However, "since 1995, hurri-
canes have become more frequent and more intense," 9 and the 2005 hurri-
cane season was the "most active, most destructive hurricane season on
" See generally Charles Babington, Hastert Tries Damage Control After Remarks Hit a
Nerve, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2005, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2005/09/02/AR2005090202156.html (detailing the widespread
criticism of House Speaker Dennis Hastert for questioning the wisdom of a carte blanche
federal approach for rebuilding New Orleans).
16 See infra Part III.
'
7 See generally Stephen M. Feldman, Comment, CERCLA Liability, Where It Is and Where
It Should Not Be Going: The Possibility of Liability Release for Environmentally Beneficial
Land Transfers, 23 ENvTL. L. 295 (1993).
8 Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For an overview of this recent
decision, see Charles Lane, JusticesAffirm Property Seizure, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005,
at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/23/
AR2005062300783pf.html.
" Joseph B. Verrengia, Natural Disaster in U.S. Morphs to Dangerous New Level, PUEBLO
CHIEFTAIN (Colo.), Oct. 1, 2005.
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record."2" In addition, as one might expect, with the rising number and
severity of storms, more lives have been disrupted.2
Perhaps the most significant reason for the sustained increase in
the number of people impacted by natural disasters has been the rapid de-
gree of migration towards coastal areas.22 With this increased movement,
the cost of cleanup operations along the nation's coasts has also risen be-
cause the values of the coastal migrants' property have "increased sub-
stantially"23 in the last few decades.
B. Detrimental Environmental Effects
In addition to the heightened physical, emotional, and economic
strain besetting American communities affected by the rising number and
severity of natural disasters, there has also been an increasing burden
placed on the environmental landscape. Among the most common environ-
mental problems engendered by natural disasters are "widespread dis-
tribution of persistent debris; accidental spills of fuel, sewage, industrial
waste, household chemicals ... and environmental damage associated
with storm debris or material cleanup, including illegal filling of wetlands
in low-lying areas and loss of landfill capacity."24 Among these concerns,
perhaps the most pervasive threat is the significant problem of "post
storm debris management."" Post-storm environmental degradation has
been even further compounded by a construction explosion on the coasts,26
which places additional strains on arguably underfunded federal, state,
and local authorities.27
2
' Editorial, Hurricane Wilma: The Last Chapter: Storm's Power Reinforces Well-Known
Lessons, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 20, 2006, at 20A.21Verrengia, supra note 19 ("Globally, more than 2.5 billion people were affected by floods,
earthquakes, hurricanes and other natural disasters between 1994 and 2003, a 60 percent
increase over the previous two 10-year periods.").
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR Sci., ECON. & THE ENV'T., supra note 2, at 83.
25 Id. at 93.
26 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, International Year of the Ocean,
http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/facts/cdevel.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) ("In recent years,
40 percent of new commercial development and 46 percent of new residential development
happened near the coast.").
27 James C. Nicholas, Paying for Growth: Solutions, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT: THE
PLANNING CHALLENGE OF THE 1990s, at 203 (Jay M. Stein ed., 1993) ("The much dis-
cussed federal retrenchment together with tax and revenue limitation efforts at the state
and local levels have tended to aggravate this problem.").
[Vol. 31:893896
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C. Human Coastal Activities Are Disrupting the Natural Ability of
Coastal Environments to Recover from Natural Disasters
Historically, coastal ecosystems have shown a remarkable ability
to regenerate28 following natural disasters such as floods and hurricanes.
However, the proliferation of "human development activities" interferes
with the "natural processes that maintain coastal shorelines and wet-
lands."29 Consequently, it is necessary to evaluate ways in which detri-
mental human effects on the environmental landscape can be mitigated.
In furtherance of that goal, this Note proposes bold new disincentives
aimed at curbing unchecked coastal encroachment and restoring greater
accountability to individuals and businesses willfully engagingz ° in envi-
ronmentally destructive activities.
II. MODERN DISASTER RELIEF MECHANISMS
A. The Inadequate Federal Scheme
Although a prima facie analysis of many federal programs aimed
at disaster relief appear helpful and well-intentioned, it seems that every
purportedly effective federal response carries with it an offsetting counter-
intuitive and counterproductive legislative enactment.3 1
1. The National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP") has taken great
strides in ensuring that citizens located in areas prone to hazardous flood-
ing known as "V-zones"32 take out mandatory3 flood insurance policies
28 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR ScI., ECON. & THE ENV'T, supra note 2, at 121.
2 Id. at 120. See also BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 40 (contrasting the
erosion rates of well-developed coastlines with "natural coastlines without buildings and
infrastructure").3 0 Id. at 94 ("Developers and real estate interests often take a 'head in the sand' attitude
and are reluctant to face the reality that the beaches are retreating, that development
disrupts the natural dynamics, or that the density of developments often exceeds the
carrying capacity with respect to natural resources and processes.").31 See H. JOHN HEINz III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENV T, supra note 2, at 19 (detailing
how federal insurance, tax, and regulatory policies continue to encourage proliferation
of unwise development in hazardous coastal areas).32 See BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 46.
3 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Nothing Could Dampen the Joy of Home
Ownership-Or Could it?, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/dampen.shtm (last visited
Apr. 15, 2007) ("Flood Insurance may be required by law.").
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and comply with a variety of federal housing regulations.34 However, the
required coverage for these individuals is the least of (1) the "maximum
amount of NFIP flood insurance coverage available," (2) the outstanding
balance on all mortgages on a homeowner's coastal real property, or (3)
the "value of the property minus the land."35 Accordingly, since the maxi-
mum amount of coverage available is $250,000 for physical structures and
$100,000 for personal property,36 one can see how the NFIP policies would
be unable to cover all costs of recovery, particularly environmental clean-
up costs, 3v which receive little attention in NFIP explanatory literature.
Another problem with the National Flood Insurance Program is
that, in an attempt to cut premiums and thus achieve affordability, rates
have been reduced "in some states," meaning that "one cannot expect
insurance to be used effectively as a policy tool for encouraging adoption
of mitigation measures. 38 In other words, the relatively low cost of pre-
miums on high-risk policies has not served as a deterrent to continued
growth initiatives, a problem which this Note addresses by proposing an
alternative taxation solution to rectify the lack of disincentives to such
unchecked growth.
While the National Flood Insurance Program was intended to be
mandatory for citizens in high-risk coastal areas, its coverage and appli-
cability in disaster prone areas is not as widespread as one would imag-
ine. For example, "the Federal government, through its 'National Flood
Insurance Program,' insured 30 percent to 40 percent of the single-family
dwellings in the region" affected by Hurricane Katrina.39 Thus, because a
large number of individual homeowners were uninsured privately or pub-
licly prior to Hurricane Katrina, they remain ill-prepared to deal with
the considerable economic, much less environmental, problems currently
besetting their land.4" Furthermore, the northern Gulf of Mexico region
' See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
ToP TEN FACTS FOR LENDERS (2004).
35 Id.
36 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF
COVERAGE (2004), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/summaryscov.pdf.
3" Christopher City, Note, Duty and Disaster: Holding Local Governments Liable for
Permitting Uses in High-Hazard Areas, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1535, 1538-39 (2000) ("[Tlhere
are costs to reconstruction-in terms of... natural resources.., that far exceed any
private or public insurance reimbursement.").38 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENV'T, supra note 2, at xxxi.
3' Rikoon, supra note 8.
'
4 For a detailed discussion of environmental problems, such as "toxic tide," associated with
Hurricane Katrina, see Knickerbocker & Jonsson, supra note 4.
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is not an insulated microcosm, but rather a reflection of the current situation
for many homeowners along the coastal seaboards of the United States.4'
An additional problem with the National Flood Insurance Program
is that, when faced with a highly-publicized natural disaster the size of
Hurricane Katrina, the program fails to adhere to its underlying equitable
principle that those who knowingly and willingly live in high-risk areas,
particularly those who refuse to insure their property, should absorb the
primary cost of cleanup operations.42
This problem was highlighted recently during the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, when slow federal response and intense public criti-
cism43 precipitated President Bush's bestowal of seemingly carte blanche
authority on the federal government to rebuild the city of New Orleans."
Such vast authority is implied by the President's statement that the clean-
up effort will simply "cost what it costs.
4 5
Because of the dangers posed by such a sweeping grant of power,
this Note proposes the development of a trip-wire mechanism to ensure
that federal relief programs will adhere to their underlying equitable under-
pinnings, even in the face of short-sighted public opposition under the
guise of compassion.46 Similarly, such a mechanism could counter efforts
by politicians to buy their way out of trouble and deflate public criticism
by unwisely directing unlimited resources towards federal programs of
41 DAvID M. BUSH ET AL., LIVING ON THE EDGE OF THE GULF: THE WEST FLORIDA AND
ALABAMACOAST 283 (2001) [hereinafter BUSH ETAL., EDGE OFTHE GULF]. ("Currently the
percentage of communities and homeowners that participate in the NFIP is low."). There
is, however, promising news on the horizon. See Ben Evans, Sales of Federal Flood
Insurance Rise, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 5, 2007, http'//www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2007/01/05/AR2007010501361.html (discussing a roughly thirteen
percent increase in the number of federal flood insurance policies purchased from
November 2005 to November 2006).
42 BUSH ET AL., EDGE OF THE GULF, supra note 41, at 283. See also Peter Whoriskey, New
Orleans Repeats Mistakes as it Rebuilds, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at Al, available at
http',/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/0L/03/AR2007010301593
_pf.html ("[Wihile new federal guidelines call for raising houses to reduce the damage of
future floods, most returning homeowners [in New Orleans] do not have to comply or are
finding ways around the costly requirement.").
4 See Gary Younge, Criticism of Bush Mounts as More than 10,000 Feared Dead,
GUARDIAN (United Kingdom), Sept. 3, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/katrina/story/
0,16441,1562005,00.html.
" OToole, supra note 13.
4Id.
46 City, supra note 37, at 1537 ("[E]fforts to impose emergency costs on the victims them-
selves remain unpopular.").
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questionable efficiency and effectiveness." This Note incorporates such
a policy into its final proposal.
2. Additional Taxation and Regulatory Schemes
Like the National Flood Insurance Program, a variety of other
federal initiatives, although well-intentioned, have led to equally coun-
terproductive and antithetical results. For example, the "1982 Coastal
Barrier Resources Act ("CBRA") acknowledged that flood insurance and
other federal benefits may serve to stimulate growth in hazardous coastal
areas."5 These initiatives range from loan programs managed by the
Small Business Administration, which subsidize rebuilding efforts in
tumultuous coastal areas like outlying barrier islands, to generous tax
incentives for coastal real estate development.49 Although some of these
policies have been acknowledged as "unwise" by the federal government,
which claims to want to "place financial risk associated with development
on those who live on or invest in the coastal barriers," ° many counter-
intuitive initiatives remain intact. Despite criticism from many groups
seeking to "break the [publicly subsidized] build-destroy-rebuild cycle,"5
the government has yet to fashion a "comprehensive, consistent national
policy on the problem of coastal hazards." 2
B. Private Insurance Remedies
Like the public sector, the private insurance industry is also
actively involved in damage assessment, rebuilding, and remuneration
following natural disasters. While private insurance may alleviate some
of the problems associated with the increasing number and costs of nat-
ural disasters on the nation's coasts, the industry is inadequately posi-
tioned to tackle the entire issue by itself.53 For example, only $40 billion
47 David W. Sar, Helping Hands: Aid for Disaster Homeless vs. Aid for "Ordinary Homeless,"
7 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 129, 145 (1995).
48 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENV'T, supra note 2, at 19.
49 
Id.
50 KARL F. NORDSTROM, BEACHES AND DUNES OF DEVELOPED COASTS 194 (2000).
5 Id. at 217. See also H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR ScI., ECON. & THE ENV'T, supra note 2,
at xxvii (proposing an "intensive, intergovernmental research effort . . .to identify
federal, state, and local public policies that.., promote growth... that increase [s] the
vulnerability of communities to coastal disasters").
52 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR ScI., ECON. AND THE ENV'T, supra note 2, at 11.
5' For a discussion of the proportion of Hurricane Katrina cleanup costs covered by private
[Vol. 31:893900
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of the estimated $70 to $130 billion cost of Katrina will be covered by
private insurance.54 In addition, some Katrina insurers "are practicing
a technique known as 'slow rolling,' procrastinating in making payments
in hopes that claimants grow tired, desolate and more likely to accept
what is offered."55 Compounding this bleak situation is the fact that "most
people in the affected area did not have flood insurance because it was not
available through private insurance companies." 6 As a combined result of
these factors, more private homeowners are turning to state, local, and
federal officials for help in both the immediate and long-term cleanup
process. Yet many government programs, including the Superfund (which
will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections), typically have
considerable bureaucratic and budgetary constraints.
Another pervasive problem with private insurance in the context of
natural disasters is that many homeowners' policies specifically exclude or
severely limit coverage for losses associated with pollution.5" Consequently,
a comprehensive public initiative is needed to fill the void left by private
insurance in responding to the environmental problems wrought by nat-
ural disasters. This Note describes such an innovative, equitable solution.
Even though the private insurance industry largely restricts its
coverage over such efforts as environmental cleanup operations, in a 1998
press release, Consumers Union documented a concerted effort by the
industry to lobby the federal government to "step in to provide financial
assistance" in "the wake of billions of dollars of losses from hurricanes and
insurance, see Taylor, supra note 3.
5 4 Id.
" Katie Fairbank & Jennifer LaFleur, Katrina Survivors Face Next Task: Dealing with
Insurance Company, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 13, 2005. There is, however, some
promising news for embattled homeowners as evidenced by the recent litigation. See
State Farm Liable in Katrina Case (Jan. 11, 2007), httpJ/www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 16579242/
("Ajury... awarded $2.5 million in punitive damages to a couple who sued State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. for denying their claim after Hurricane Katrina, a decision that
could benefit hundreds of other homeowners challenging insurers for refusing to cover
billions of dollars in storm damage.").
5 Rikoon, supra note 8.
5 Bruce Yandle, Superfund and Risky Risk Reduction, in CUrrING GREEN TAPE: Toxic
POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE LAW 34 (Richard L. Stroup & Roger
E. Meiners eds., 2000) ("Through 1991, the [Environmental Protection Agency] had used
$4.4 billion, some 48 percent of Superfund appropriations, to cover administrative costs.").
" Michael E. Brown, The Pollution Exclusion in the Homeowner's Policy: A Meat Ax or
a Scalpel?, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CLAIMS AND PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE 333
(Dianne K. Dailey ed., 1997).
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earthquakes."59 Despite these potentially large government settlements
and bailouts, the industry has at the same time been taking steps to de-
crease its overall coverage and liability by "dropping or refusing to renew
policies... withdraw[ing] from higher risk areas, and [shifting] ... all or
a portion of their liability to consumers and taxpayers." ° In the follow-
ing sections, this Note explores how the current disaster relief system,
including private disaster insurance, has created a costly, ineffective, and
thoroughly untenable situation for individual landowners seeking both
economic relief and environmental cleanup assistance.
III. THE SUPERFUND: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
A. CERCLA: An Overview
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), which is now
"commonly known as Superfund."6' The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") touts the measure as helping to clean the "nation's hazardous
waste sites."62 The Superfund is a government "trust fund, financed by
taxes, ... which is used to cover the response costs of government."63
Despite its numerous successes and well-defined environmental stan-
dards,' because it is a trust fund, the program has limited financial re-
sources and is thus unable to adequately respond to all environmental
disasters falling within its purview.6" Indeed, "the EPA's ultimate fear
is that using [Superfund] dollars liberally without corresponding reim-
bursement will deplete its resources leaving the environment and the
" Press Release, Consumers Union, Natural Disaster Insurance: The Consumer
Perspective (Jan. 15, 1998) [hereinafter Consumers Union Press Release], available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/0116prin.htm.
60 Id.
6" Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510,94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2007)). See also
Environmental Protection Agency, CERCLA Overview, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/
action/law/cercla.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
62 Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2007).
' Joseph C. Sweeney, Protection of the Environment in the United States, 1 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REP. 1, 43 (1989) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621.
65 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. et al., Cost Recovery by Private Parties Under CERCLA:
Planning a Response Action for Maximum Recovery, 27 TULSA L.J. 365, 368 (1992).
[Vol. 31:893902
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public's interest in it without protection."" The significant problem of
the undercapitalization of the Superfund has been well documented, and
until the situation changes, the majority of hazardous waste sites will
be left "as is" because their sheer numbers outstrip the EPA's financial
ability to clean them up.67
B. Obstacles to Relief Under the Superfund
As a consequence of the program's budgetary constraints, the
Superfund is more likely to deal with imminent, large-scale pollution
threats such as toxic waste dumps, brownfields,"8 and widespread in-
dustrial pollution. As such, it is unlikely to address the cleanup of "toxic
tide"69 from the relatively small property claims of adversely affected
individuals in New Orleans.7 ° For this reason, many commentators have
noted that the Superfund simply does not "adequately resolve the issue
of natural resource damages on private property."7'
One of the many reasons for the creation of the Superfund was to
provide private parties with a mechanism through which they could re-
cover cleanup costs incurred as a result of the actions of an industrial
polluter. 2 Considering the fact that much of the environmental damage
stemming from Hurricane Katrina and other natural disasters was
wrought by commercial pollution from oil and chemical producers,73 it
would be useful for private homeowners to utilize the Superfund as a
means to recoup some of their cleanup costs from these corporate pol-
luters. However, even if such homeowners are able to meet the require-
' Feldman, supra note 17, at 320.
67 Reitze, supra note 65, at 368.
' See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelop-
ment, http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
69 Knickerbocker & Jonsson, supra note 4.
71 See Michael A. Walker, CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions: A Loophole for
Private Landowners?, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 425, 443 (1995).
71 Id.
71 See Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund Cost Recovery, http://www.epa.gov/
region5/defs/html/rcra.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) (describing the recoverable costs of
private parties under the Superfund).
" Betsy McKay, Katrina Oil Spill Clouds Future of Battered Suburb: Health Concerns
Loom Large for Waiting Homeowners, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2006, http://www.corpwatch
.org/article.php?id=13016 ("Hurricane Katrina triggered 575 petroleum and hazardous
chemical spills.... Ten of the biggest spills in Louisiana caused by the hurricane add up
to about eight million gallons.").
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ments for recovery, the Fund is often ineffective due to the overriding
bankruptcy protections afforded to many businesses found liable through
the Act.74 Indeed, "as a result of the high costs, many of those found liable
under CERCLA are forced into bankruptcy for relief' which "frustrates
the goals of the act."7"
In addition to bankruptcy, some corporations and individuals may
wish to abandon or transfer their interests to those willing and able to
take on the considerable task of environmental cleanup following a nat-
ural disaster. However, "[tlo the extent that a person continues to own or
use land there is a continuing obligation to comply with environmental
laws, and a person may not be permitted to transfer or legally abandon
the site."76 Thus, environmental groups seeking to acquire polluted land77
may be thwarted in their efforts due to the numerous statutory obstacles
embedded in Superfund legislation.
Furthermore, many corporations and private individuals may seek
the protections of the infamous "act of God" provision of CERCLA in order
to escape potential liability for environmental cleanup.7" This exception
protects polluters only if the environmental damage "results solely from
a grave natural disaster and if that grave natural disaster is wholly un-
anticipated."79 Consequently, "grave natural disasters which could not be
anticipated in the design, location, or operation of the facility... by reason
of historic, geographic, or climatic circumstances or phenomena would be
outside the scope of the owner's or operator's responsibility."8 0 Although
this seems like a straightforward definition, there are a variety of strin-
gent requirements and bureaucratic obstacles for claiming an "act of God"
defense."1 Indeed, its usage and application has been significantly limited
to date, and any "contributory causation by human acts or omissions not
covered by another CERCLA defense would vitiate an act of God defense.
" See generally Jason V. Stitt, The Dischargeability of Environmental Claims in
Bankruptcy: Resolution of Diametrically Opposed Goals, 17 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 27 (2002-2003).
75 id.
76 Reitze, supra note 65, at 424-25.77 See generally Feldman, supra note 17.7
1 See Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund Liability Defenses, Exemptions and
Protections, http'//www.epa.gov/compliance/cleanup/superfund/liability.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2007).
71 Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d 561 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
80 Id. at 564.
81 See generally Ralph M. Sugg, Blame It On The Rain? El Nio Is No Excuse to Pollute,
21 WHITTIER L. REV. 737 (2000).
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Not surprisingly, this defense has seldom been invoked." 2 As a result of
its limited usage yet sweeping grant of immunity, the government, cor-
porations, and private individuals spend vast amounts of time and money
waging court battles to either restrict or expand its usage, causing sig-
nificant delays in environmental cleanup operations 3 to the detriment
of all citizens.
In fact, the Superfund is currently plagued by both a bloated bu-
reaucracy" and frequent, "costly litigation induced by Superfund's rule
of liability" that "decreases the supply of cleanup activity." 5 Consequently,
the "act of God" and bankruptcy protections exasperate the government's
efforts not only by causing costly delays, but more importantly, by putting
the entire burden of cleanup costs on an arguably overtaxed electorate
and undercapitalized federal environmental and emergency agencies. To
ameliorate this situation, courts must construe the "act of God" defense
narrowly so as to discourage litigators from invoking it except in truly
unforeseeable cases.
IV. BEYOND THE SUPERFUND: OTHER SYSTEMIC CONSIDERATIONS
A. Federal Disaster Relief
With the Disaster Relief Act of 1974,6 Congress began implement-
ing standardized procedures for providing federal relief to citizens affected
by natural disasters. Currently, federal aid following a natural disaster
"may include housing for up to 18 months, low-interest loans for unin-
sured property losses, and dollar grants for those unable to repay loans.
Homeowners can qualify for up to $200,000 for home repairs and
$40,000 for replacement of personal property." 7 When one considers that
"[tihe U.S. national average purchase price for a single-family home reached
82 See Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 45
Bus. LAw. 923,985 (1990).
8 Yandle, supra note 57, at 46 (describing the problems associated with the overly-litigious
nature of the Superfund scheme).
8 Id. at 34 (detailing the proportion of Superfund expenditures used to "cover admin-
istrative costs").85 Id. at 46.
86 Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974).
87 Natalie R. Cohen, The Impacts of Natural Disasters on Municipal Finance, American
Planning Association, PLANNING ADVISORY SERV. MEMO, Mar. 1996, at 1, available at
http://www.planning .org/katrina/pdf/PINMar96.pdf.
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$264,540 in October 2004 "s8 and "[a]verage U.S. home prices increased
12.50 percent from the first quarter of 2004 through the first quarter of
2005," 89 these figures pale in comparison to the actual cost of homeown-
ers' post-disaster reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, the primary thrust
of the federal grant programs are to provide economic relief for rebuild-
ing and repairing damaged structures in the short term.90 The statutes give
little attention to environmental cleanup efforts, and it is unjust to force
homeowners to ration what few dollars have been made available among
safety, physical health, economic livelihood, and environmental restoration.
In addition to the financial limitations of federal disaster relief
programs, many recent federal efforts are beset by extreme bureaucratic
inefficiency9' and fiscal mismanagement.92 Nearly three months after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita ravaged the Gulf region, "only about 5,000
of the 225,000 possible [National Flood Insurance Program] claims [had]
been settled."93 In addition, federal authorities have proven themselves in-
effective in helping individuals pursue remedies via private insurance,94
which further exacerbates the budgetary constraints of private home-
owners who must then resort to costly legal countermeasures in order to
secure funding.95 Consequently, critics of federal disaster relief efforts
have commented that "individual disaster aid programs work with varying
degrees of effectiveness and generally low degrees of efficiency."96
In addition, federal relief efforts continue to be plagued by a severe
lack of funding, even for purportedly self-sustaining programs like the
National Flood Insurance Program. In a recent report released by the
Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), U.S. Comptroller General
' Robert Longley, Average Home Price Tops $264,000 in October, ABOUT.CoM, http://
usgovinfo.about. com/od/consumerawareness/a/avghomeprice04.htm.
" Press Release, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, U.S. House Prices
Continue to Rise Rapidly (June 1, 2005), http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/lq05hpi.pdf.
90 NORDSTROM, supra note 50, at 223 ("Politicians respond readily to emergency actions
that focus on repair but quickly lose their interest in support for long-term projects.").91 Sar, supra note 47, at 145.
92 O'Toole, supra note 13 ("Post disaster spending in recent decades has been notorious
for abuse and waste.").
" Fairbank & LaFleur, supra note 55. See also Disaster Mitigation and Cost Reduction
Act of 1999, H.R. REP No. 106-40 (1999) (discussing funding available for home repairs
and money available to individuals through federal grant and loan programs).
Fairbank & LaFleur, supra note 55.
9 9See generally Laura Parker, After Katrina, Courts Flooded by Lawsuits, USA TODAY,
Jan. 15, 2006, httpJ/www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-01-15-katrina-suitsx.htm. See
also State Farm Liable in Katrina Case, supra note 55.
96 Sar, supra note 47, at 145.
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David M. Walker remarked that the NFIP "is essentially bankrupt" and
that "FEMA officials estimate that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will
result in flood insurance claims of about $23 billion, far surpassing the
total amount of claims paid in the entire history of the [program] through
2004."17 Furthermore, in a sign of things to come, FEMA's ability to bor-
row from the U.S. Treasury was recently increased "from $1.5 billion prior
to the 2004 hurricane season to $18.5 billion through fiscal year 2008."9s
B. Eminent Domain
With the recent Supreme Court decision of Kelo v. City of New
London,99 state, local, and federal officials will have an easier time exer-
cising eminent domain in order to correct the considerable economic and
environmental blight which frequently accompanies natural disasters.
In fact, this newly conferred authority recently manifested itself in a
recovery proposal outlined by government officials in New Orleans that
included a "federally funded forced buyout of homes in neighborhoods
deemed unlivable."100
In addition, the federal government increasingly can rely on the
authority granted by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emer-
gency Assistance Act 1'' to purchase damaged real property with qualified
government buyouts as prescribed under the Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, which pertains to persons dis-
placed by natural disasters.' 2
97 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. No. GAO-06-442T, HURRICANE KATRINA:
GAO's PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
38 (2006) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06442t.pdf. See also Ben Evans, Sales of
Federal Flood Insurance Rise (Jan. 5, 2007), httpJ/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
tent/ article/2007/01/05/AR2007010501361.html ('The [NFIP] was self-financed for decades
until the storms of 2005 wrecked its finances. It expects to be about $20 billion in debt
to the Treasury once all claims are paid.").
9 8 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABrLITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 38-39.
9 Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See also Lane, supra note 18.
' Kim Cobb, New Orleans Residents are Enraged Over Recovery Plan, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/3581613.html.
1' Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288,
§ 101, 88 Stat. 143, 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2007)) (evidencing
a Congressional intent to "[encourage] hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from
disasters, including development of land use and construction regulations").
1'2 See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894, 1894 (1971) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4601
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Further, government entities have begun to preemptively exercise
their eminent domain power as a "flood hazard mitigation technique"1 °3
designed to lessen the potential risk of flood damage even before a natural
disaster strikes. °4 Lastly, the Upton-Jones Amendment to the National
Flood Insurance Program stresses relocation instead of continual re-
construction by authorizing the use of"up to 40% of the [NFIP-insured]
value" of homes covered by the program for relocating the "threatened
house rather than paying a larger amount to help rebuild it, only to see
the rebuilt house destroyed in a subsequent storm, and paying to rebuild
again ... and again."
10 5
While many of these federal initiatives are a step in the right
direction and should be encouraged accordingly, as this Note will explore
in the following sections, greater government involvement in disaster re-
lief frequently precipitates a wide array of new challenges.
V. WHERE THE COST SHOULD LIE: APPORTIONING LIABILITY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS
A. The Expanding Role of the Federal Government
As evidenced by the preceding sections, a variety of factors have
prompted the noticeable shift towards federally-subsidized disaster re-
lief.0 6 Among these factors are the decreasing role of the private in-
surance industry in disaster relief,'17 the expanding role of the federal
government in apportioning money to adversely affected citizens,0 8 and
the increasing willingness of government officials to exercise powers of
eminent domain to correct environmental problems stemming from natural
disasters.1 9 On the one hand, it must be noted that even this expanding
influence has often been inadequate to meet the needs of many ill-equipped
(2007)) (attempting to "establish uniform and equitable land acquisition policies for Federal
and federally assisted programs").
10' Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 351.
104 Id.
105 BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 93-94.
'o
6 See id. at 4 (characterizing current federal relief efforts as large, counterintuitive entitle-
ments).
107 See generally Consumers Union Press Release, supra note 59.
108 H. JOHN HEINz III CTR. FOR Sci., ECON. & THE ENV'T, supra note 2, at 12-13 ("Costs of
disasters to the federal government have been rising dramatically.").
109 See generally Barnhizer, supra note 14.
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homeowners in their cleanup efforts," ° and thus an argument could be
made that greater government involvement should be encouraged. On
the other hand, one must inquire whether the nearly insurmountable
economic and environmental damage stemming from natural disasters
is a result of the increasing willingness for the federal government to
rescue individuals engaging in riskier, more environmentally harmful
development practices."1
B. Moral Hazard112 Engendered by Government Action
The alleged shift towards a publicly subsidized natural disaster
relief effort has drawn mounting criticism."' In his article on the sub-
ject, Daniel D. Barnhizer argues that "current government responses to
flooding.., promote and maintain unwise development in coastal flood-
plains."" 4 Barnhizer articulates in great detail how "government entities
continue to expend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to repair
repeated and foreseeable damage to unwise and unsustainable private
development."" 5 This issue of "moral hazard""6 is troublesome in many
ways. First and foremost, it causes private developers to engage in riskier
development projects with the knowledge that they will be able to rely
on large government subsidies and bailouts to recoup their investments
in the event of a devastating natural disaster."' In essence, such devel-
opers are exploiting the overwhelming empathy and generosity which nor-
mally accompanies a natural disaster of the size and scope of Hurricane
Katrina for personal gain,"' inevitably increasing "taxpayer exposure to
110 See Walker, supra note 70, at 426.
... See BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 4 ("We are contributing to a giant
welfare system in which high-risk development is encouraged and then rewarded when
disaster strikes!").
112 O'Toole, supra note 13 (discussing the issue of"moral hazard," a phenomenon "whereby
generosity promotes risk, 'by increasing the expectations of local residents ... about the
future federal response.., the danger is... people will rebuild in dangerous areas with
the expectation that the federal government's deep pockets will bail them out'").113 See NORDSTROM, supra note 50, at 217 (detailing how various groups have expressed a
desire to "end public subsidies to private development in hazard areas and break the build-
destroy-rebuild cycle").
114 Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 296.
115 Id.
116 O'Toole, supra note 13.
117 Id.
118 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR Sci., ECON. & THE ENVT, supra note 2, at 2 ("[Dlepending upon
their insurance coverage and eligibility for federal assistance of various types, victims can
transfer much of the economic consequences of disaster damage to other levels of society.").
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fund this cycle of repair and reconstruction,"1 19 and placing unnecessary
strains on vulnerable environmental areas and important public emer-
gency response capabilities.
C. State and Local Environmental Enforcement Schemes
Some commentators have argued that the federalization of disaster
relief, particularly in the environmental arena, is a disturbing trend, and
greater authority for setting and enforcing environmental standards
should be delegated to-the state and local level. 2 ° However, such critics
largely ignore the problems of "uneven state [regulatory] performance," 2'
negative externalities resulting from a lack of uniform state and local en-
vironmental commitments,' 22 and the increasing political complexity of
environmental regulation. 2 ' This section examines each issue in turn.
Currently, states exercise tremendous freedom in setting and en-
forcing environmental policy.'24 "States collectively issue more than 90
percent of all environmental permits, complete more than 75 percent of
all environmental enforcement actions, and rely on the federal govern-
ment for only 20 percent of their total funding." 2 ' However, with greater
autonomy comes growing regulatory disparity. Coastal environmental
"state programs vary widely in the absence of national... standards,"26
and even when mandatory federal standards are in place, states are
frequently lax in their overall enforcement. 27 Moreover, there is little
119 Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 342.
... See generally David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards,
in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 266 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997). See also
Whoriskey, supra note 42 (quoting Donald E. Powell, Federal Coordinator of Gulf Coast
Rebuilding, as stating, "[flederal tax dollars should not be.used to rebuild in places that
repeatedly flood or are damaged due to Mother Nature-in New Orleans or elsewhere").
121 Barry G. Rabe, Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTuRY 33, 42
(Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2003) (citation omitted).
122 Scott A. Bollens, Environmental and Economic Policies, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT:
THE PLANNING CHALLENGE OF THE 1990S, supra note 27, at 143, 144.
121 See generally Donald F. Kettl, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 1, 10
(Donald F. Kettl ed., 2002) (chronicling the complex state task of balancing "the intricate
interrelationships of companies, interest groups, [and] cross-media pollution problems").
124 Rabe, supra note 121, at 35.
12 Id. at 34.
126 NORDSTROM, supra note 50, at 194.
127 Rabe, supra note 121, at 43 ("In 1998 a two-year examination of state enforcement and
inspection practices by the EPA inspector general resulted in a scathing assessment of
basic environmental implementation in a number of states... major violations of federal
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indication that states with a relatively low commitment to regulatory
enforcement are improving.
128
Such wide-ranging state environmental approaches require the
federal government to be at the forefront of the regulatory effort to achieve
a sensible, rational disaster relief policy capable of realizing full and fair
economic and environmental recovery. Furthermore, it is only fair that we
develop a federal approach since every American taxpayer is affected by
coastal natural disasters, "even those far removed from the shore." 29
Like the states, local governments also have wide-ranging envi-
ronmental regulatory enforcement schemes and varied success rates. 30
One of the major reasons for such disparities is competition for the
booming economic development on the coasts. 13' Economic growth has
become essential for the continued stability and vitality of local govern-
ments, leading some critics to comment that "[tihe very essence of a
locality is its operation as a growth machine." 32 Consequently, cities and
municipalities, in an effort to best the competition, may be more willing
to approve unwise construction proposals in order to secure a continual
stream of economic growth,'33 thereby endangering coastal ecosystems
and exponentially increasing negative environmental externalities in
neighboring areas.3
The tendency for state and local officials to compete for economic
growth may lead to their easily becoming beholden to special interests.135
environmental laws often go unreported... [and] permit deadlines are routinely ignored.")
(citation omitted).
'28 Id. at 42.
129 BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 3.
130 See, e.g., Local Government Environmental Assistance Network, Regulatory Infor-
mation, http://www.lgean.orghtml/regs.cfm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
13' International Year of the Ocean, supra note 26.
132 KENT E. PORTNEY, TAKING SUSTAINABLE CITIES SERIOUSLY 103 (2003) (citing Harvey
Molotch, The City as Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. OF
Soc. 309 (1976)). See also BUSH ETAL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 168 (describ-
ing the view of some politicians that continued economic development is the nation's
"manifest destiny").
133 PORTNEY, supra note 132, at 101 ("Not all cities have the luxury of being able to choose
what kinds of economic development they will accept, and indeed the 'beggars can't be
choosers' mentality is alive and well in many U.S. cities.").
14 Bollens, supra note 122, at 144 ("Fragmentation of growth management efforts en-
courages policymakers in one locality to ignore the harmful effects of their local decisions
(such as environmental degradation or increased traffic congestion) felt by individuals
outside their borders.").
13' Kettl, supra note 123.
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As such, branches of the federal government, particularly administrative
agencies like the EPA, are in a better position to implement significant,
lasting reform intended to safeguard coastal environments as well as en-
sure "smart growth"136 along the nation's shores.
D. Cultivating a Measured Political Response and Mobilizing a
Disconnected American Electorate
While a federally-mandated initiative to curb unchecked coastal
development and reform taxpayer-funded disaster relief appears to be
the most effective solution, it remains necessary to identify and elaborate
upon existing policies at the federal level. First, while U.S. presidents
have been declaring federal disaster areas with greater frequency,'37 lead-
ing to skyrocketing federal spending,138 these expenditures have been
aimed primarily at short-term rebuilding projects rather than truly sus-
tainable solutions."' As indicated by President Bush's carte blanche atti-
tude towards rebuilding New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, 4 0 it
is easier for politicians at the national level to perpetuate the oft-criticized
"cycle of repair and reconstruction"141 than examine its underlying causes.
Even initiatives aimed at restoring accountability and personal responsi-
bility, such as the self-sustaining and "mandatory"142 aspects of programs
like the National Flood Insurance Program, are not immune from the
turbulent political forces brought on by great natural disasters. In fact,
"[p]erhaps the greatest shortcoming of the NFIP is that the policy of 'no
federal assistance' to the uninsured is frequently circumvented under
political pressure in the poststorm relief/reconstruction period, undercut-
ting the intent of the law and increasing the cost of disaster relief."1 43 Con-
sequently, it is imperative that we remove such decisions from politicians,
who are too easily manipulated by tempestuous impulses and political
machinations. This Note proposes a built-in taxation scheme, outlined in
136 PORTNEY, supra note 132, at 104.
137 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR Sci., ECON. & THE ENV'T, supra note 2, at 12-13.
138 Id.
13' NORDSTROM, supra note 50, at 223-24.
140 See O'Toole, supra note 13.
141 Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 342.
142 Nothing Could Dampen the Joy of Home Ownership-Or Could it?, supra note 33
("Flood Insurance may be required by law.").
'" BUSH ET AL., EDGE OF THE GULF, supra note 41, at 283.
[Vol. 31:893912
RESTORING RESPONSIBILITY IN DISASTER RELIEF
the next section, to be levied against all high-risk development in vulner-
able coastal areas, known as "v-zones."'" This taxation scheme will serve
as a means of distancing short-term political considerations from the fed-
eral disaster response. In so doing, the scheme will effectively restore
some semblance of personal responsibility in the allocation of cleanup
costs related to natural disasters.
Politicians deserve much of the blame for the untenable nature of
federal disaster relief, but taxpayers themselves are surprisingly complicit
in the current scheme. Indeed, "[t] axpayers readily finance disaster rescue
and recovery costs, and efforts to impose emergency costs on the victims
themselves remain unpopular."'45 This Note contends, however, that the
reason for the apparent willingness of taxpayers to fund federal disaster
relief efforts stems from a significant disconnect between the electorate
and the general spending mechanism through which the government
funds disaster relief. Although no study yet corroborates this claim, the
average taxpayer is more likely to be inundated with images of suffering
and destruction wrought by natural disasters than he or she is to become
acquainted with the underlying systemic factors that exacerbate the level
of destruction." Taxpayers' feelings of outrage, compassion, and empathy
help to rationalize the expenditure of large, abstract sums of federal
money to help victims of natural disasters, even though taxpayers should
instead be directing their ire at those knowingly taking advantage of the
"public subsidies to private development in hazard areas."'47
Compounding this problem is the alleged decline in the public's
trust in government and general feelings of alienation from the political
process. 4 ' Furthermore, because this issue involves a variety of complex
environmental issues, the public's distrust and alienation may be particu-
larly heightened due to "difficulties of data access" and "data interpreta-
tion," leading to a situation wherein "citizens face obvious challenges in
assimilating expertise sufficient to participate meaningfully in technical
I" BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 46.
145 City, supra note 37, at 1538.
14 See generally O'Toole, supra note 13 (describing the moral hazard problem associated
with unchecked coastal development).
147 NORDSTROM, supra note 50, at 217.
'4 See NAT'L COMM. ON THE ENV'T, CHOOSING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 52 (1993).
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discussions."14 9 As such, it is imperative that any effective solution con-
centrate less on the dizzying intricacies of "v-zones," 5 ° "erosion rates ,"'
externalities,"'52 and "the moral hazard problem," 53 and more on ensur-
ing that the public truly understands that the "cycle of repair and recon-
struction,"5 4 wrought by unwise coastal development will affect every
citizen's environment 55 and checkbook 56 directly. A clearly articulated
strategy coupled with a simple taxation scheme and equitable regulatory
mechanism will result in the realization, finally, that of the underlying
principle of existing environmental law: "polluter pays. ""'
VI. CONFRONTING THE ISSUE
A. Introduction
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, the United States
faces a momentous challenge in both cultivating a measured political re-
sponse and changing the average American taxpayer's perspective on
disaster relief. As Theodore Steinberg, a Professor of History at Case
Western Reserve University, argues, the predominant view in this country
is that natural disasters are simply "unpredictable acts of God." 58 Even
so, Steinberg contends that "we need to overcome [this] collective denial
149 Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., Civic Sustainability of Reform, in ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE 162 (Donald F. Kettl ed., 2002).
150 BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 46.
151 See generally Jeffery A. Zinn, Coastal Flooding, Erosion, and Sea Level Rise, in CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE No. 97-588, OCEANS & COASTAL RESOURCES: A BRIEFING
BOOK (1997), available at http://ncseonline.orgnle/crsreports/briefingbooks/oceans/o.cfn.
152 Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 341.
153 O'Toole, supra note 13.
15 Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 342.
5 BUSH ETAL., RULES OFTHE SEA, supra note 9, at 94 ("Eroding beaches, removed dunes,
disappearing forest cover, beach nourishment projects, and failing seawalls are examples
of community problems that all individual property owners pay for, whether or not their
property is directly involved.").
156 Id. at 3 ("Every federal taxpayer (even those far removed from the shore) also con-
tributes through underwriting disaster assistance, the national flood insurance program,
loans to communities to build ... and the list of 'donuts for disaster victims' goes on.").
"' Superfund Program: Status of Cleanup Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Super-
fund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment of the S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works,
106th Cong. 59 (2000) [hereinafter Superfund Hearing] (responses of Louis J. Schiffer
to Additional Questions from Sen. Lautenberg).
1 O'Toole, supra note 13.
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about natural disaster and we need to budget for it and prepare for it." 159
To do so, the government should take steps to strengthen existing laws
as well as support innovative state and local policies.
First, the federal government must strictly enforce the provisions
of the National Flood Insurance Program, particularly those which make
the Program mandatory.'60 Furthermore, federal authorities should con-
sider adopting proposals calling for the denial of "flood insurance and
federal disaster assistance to current property owners located in coastal
high-hazard areas whose housing and buildings do not meet the standard
for new construction."' 6 ' Strictly enforcing these existing standards and
taking a firmer stance against unchecked development must be the first
steps in any successful federal effort.
Second, the federal government should do more to encourage
the adoption of state and local environmental policies aimed at "smart
growth."6 2 For example, "a number of communities have been imposing
additional charges on developers" known as "impact fees."'63 However,
these fees are typically earmarked for projects such as "roads, schools,
and parks, that are directly associated with the new development,"1"4 and
not problems such as erosion and post-disaster environmental cleanup
costs that are exacerbated by such growth. To supplement these existing
federal, state, and local measures, the government needs a strategy that
effectively addresses the ultimate issue.
To begin, it is important to truly get back to the basics with an
examination of what a "natural disaster" or "act of God" should mean in the
context of federal disaster relief. As citizens, we too often let our emotion,
empathy, and propensity for compassion and generosity cloud necessary
thoughtful analysis, which engenders a desire to simply throw money at
a problem165 without first addressing underlying systemic concerns.
Modern courts have defined "acts of God" as "grave natural disas-
ters which could not be anticipated in the design, location, or operation
1
59 
Id.1 Nothing Could Dampen the Joy of Home Ownership - Or Could it?, supra note 33.
1' BUSH ET AL., EDGE OF THE GULF, supra note 41, at 282-83.
..2 PORTNEY, supra note 132, at 104.
"6 Marc T. Smith, Evolution and Conflict in Growth Management, in GROWTH
MANAGEMENT: THE PLANNING CHALLENGE OF THE 1990s, supra note 27, at 49. See also
Nicholas, supra note 27, at 208.
16 Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington, Impact Fees, http://www
.mrsc.org/subjects/planning/impactpg.aspx?r=1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).16 See O'Toole, supra note 13.
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of the facility."166 Although often used in a variety of contexts,167 the term
"act of God" encompasses the idea of true unforeseeability, which thereby
negates the owner's responsibility for the adverse consequences of the
disaster. 16 Former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert had the courage
to question the wisdom of spending billions in taxpayer funded money to
rebuild New Orleans, "a city that's 7 feet under sea level."'69 He eventually
recanted the statement after facing a tremendous amount of backlash
from the national media and the public. 70 While the timing of his state-
ment may have caused him to appear insensitive, the underlying logic of
his words should not have been discounted so quickly. The "historic, geo-
graphic, or climatic circumstances" 171 of a location must once again become
the central focus of a well-reasoned approach to the proper apportionment
of liability for the cleanup costs associated with natural disasters. With
this definition in mind, real estate developers who engage in reckless con-
struction projects should not be able to ignore 72 the long-term effects of
their actions simply by claiming that economic and environmental damage
wrought by their activities is an "act of God."
B. Strengthening the Superfund
Strictly construing the definition of an "act of God" to exclude the
reasonably foreseeable and preventable economic and environmental
consequences of overzealous construction in low-lying floodplains' 73 may
permit the government to reapportion some of the rising costs of disaster
16 Sabine Towing & Transp. Co, Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d 561, 564 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
167 See Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star Shipping AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1239 (D. Ala. 2001)
(defining an act of God as "any accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes
without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably
to have been expected could have been prevented").
16' See Sabine Towing, 666 F.2d at 564; see generally Superfund Liability Defenses,
Exemptions and Protections, supra note 78.
169 Hastert: Rebuilding New Orleans 'Doesn't Make Sense to Me,' STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.startribune.com/dynamic/mobile-story.php?story=5592348.
170 See generally Babington, supra note 15.
171 Sabine Towing, 666 F.2d at 564.
172 BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 94.
1 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, THIS IS FEMA: A LOOK AT THE FEDERAL GOvERN-
MENT'S PRIMARY DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY RESOURCE (2004) [hereinafter THIS IS
FEMA] ("FEMA also maps the nation's floodplains to identify flood hazards and works
with state and local officials to minimize flood risks.").
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relief to developers who willfully and recklessly engage in such conduct.'74
Such an outcome could also help discourage development in environmen-
tally sensitive areas and relieve the onerous and unjust burden currently
assigned to American taxpayers.'75 The Superfund itself already provides
a useful mechanism through which such a goal may be realized.
First, the legislative intent behind the Superfund scheme is that
the liable parties under the act are "those that are responsible for the
contamination at a given site... the 'polluter pays' principle." 76 Clearly,
developers who engage in risky coastal construction projects and the
buyers who willingly finance such initiatives would fit under such a defi-
nition. Second, there is already a clearly defined standard of liability
under the Act, in which "the cost of restoring an injured natural resource
to its pre-injury state [is] the measure of damages to be awarded in cases
brought under CERCLA."' 77 Last, the overall scope of "natural resources"
protected under the Act is also clearly and "broadly defined."' As such,
by bringing the destructive effects of high-risk coastal development under
the Superfund umbrella, the federal government does not need to enact
sweeping new legislation and wait for thejudiciary to interpret each pro-
vision before liability can be imposed.
In addition, perhaps the most appealing feature of the Superfund
is its emphasis on the court system to further private environmental re-
covery efforts.'79 Accordingly, environmental groups and concerned tax-
payers alike should be encouraged to use the Superfund system in the
wake of natural disasters in order to force private developers to bear a
larger share of the considerable costs associated with environmental
cleanup efforts. Further, adversely affected private homeowners could
also use the Act as a means of supplementing federal disaster aid for the
174 BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 94 (describing the willful blindness of
"developers and real estate interests" in regard to the environmental repercussions of
their ongoing activities).
175 Id. at 3.
'
76Superfund Hearing, supra note 157, at 59.
'" Raymond J. Kopp & Kerry Smith, Introduction to VALUING NATURAL ASSETS 8 (Raymond
J. Kopp & Kerry Smith eds., 1993).
118 KEVIN M. WARD & JOHN W. DUFFIELD, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: LAW AND
ECONOMICS 101 (1994) ("The term natural resources is ... broadly defined by CERCLA
as 'land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other
such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise
controlled by the United States... [or] any State or local government.'").
'
79 See Superfund Cost Recovery, supra note 72.
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environmental cleanup of private lands precipitated by unwise or over-
zealous development."18 In this manner, homeowners can remedy the de-
structive effects of such occurrences as Hurricane Katrina's toxic tide' 8'
and manmade coastal erosion.
182
The overall goal of expanding the scope of Superfund to include
more environmentally sensitive areas in coastal regions is to both engen-
der a migratory shift away from development in such vulnerable areas
and to increase private accountability for reasonably foreseeable disasters
set in motion by unfettered development. This plan requires a limit to the
"act of God" exception to truly unforeseeable events with a more literal
reading of the term "natural disaster." A multi-faceted effort would lessen
the overall size and scope of the economic and environmental disasters,
and similarly reduce the strain on the federal coffers, which would enable
the federal government to address the more pressing needs of individuals
affected by unforeseeable disasters. In other words, this restriction would
provide a built-in mechanism for separating truly needy, innocent land-
owners from those who recklessly invited misfortune upon themselves.
VII. IMPLEMENTING AN EQUITABLE TAXATION SCHEME
A. Providing Adequate Capitalization for the Superfund
Now that this Note has explained the need to expand the Super-
fund's scope to include risky coastal development activities, it becomes
necessary to develop a means to fund such a broad expansion. The current
CERCLA funding scheme has resulted in a situation in which "most haz-
ardous waste sites are unlikely to be cleaned up by the EPA because the
number of sites in need of cleanup simply exceeds the EPA's resources. " "
Consequently, it would be unreasonable to expect that Congress would
expand the scope of the Superfund to include more coastal developments
in environmentally-sensitive areas without a commensurate increase in
funding. As such, this Note proposes the implementation of a national
sales tax on developments located in high risk coastal area flood zones (as
defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency as "V zones")'"
's BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 94.
181 See Knickerbocker & Jonsson, supra note 4.
182 BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 40.
182 Reitze, supra note 65, at 368.
1 84FloodSmart.gov, Flood Zones Defined, http:// www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/
riskassesment/floodzonesdefined.jsp (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) (defining "V zones" as
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that are built in such a manner as is almost certain to result in consider-
able economic and environmental damage in the event of a strong hurri-
cane or great flood. Not only would such a tax structure provide additional
capitalization for the Superfund, but it would also promote more cautious
development in coastal areas and greater responsibility for cleanup oper-
ations, thus accomplishing many of the same goals inherent in existing
Superfund legislation."l 5
B. The Importance of an Incentive Based Taxation Scheme
To encourage more cautious development, legislation must link
the offending activity directly to the tax. Currently, funding for CERCLA
comes "from a series of taxes, especially on crude oil and petrochemi-
cals."" 6 However, "[ithere is no direct relationship between the creation
of waste sites and the taxing structure of Superfund."'87 Consequently,
CERCLA lacks built-in disincentives to curb the offending activity.
Scores of economists' 8 have written about the microeconomic
effects of such built-in disincentives in businesses' strategic decisions.
Specifically, these disincentives impose economic costs on firms, leading
to an "internalization of the externality," wherein, for example, "the so-
cial costs of hazardous substance discharge and oil spills [are] taken into
account in the firm's decision making."8 9 As such, just as corporate pol-
luters must take into account such costs in terms of fines and taxes, so
too should risky coastal developers take into account the rising economic
"[cloastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and an additional hazard asso-
ciated with storm waves. These areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30-
year mortgage").
"85 Kopp & Smith, supra note 177, at 28-29 ("In all parts of Superfund . .. Congress
intended to [fashion] a powerful protective and compensatory mechanism based on a
broad theory of cost internalization, primarily to give the costs of rectification back to the
parties who benefitted, but also to provide a disincentive to future harmful conduct.").188 Kent Jeffreys, Amending Superfund: Reform or Revanche?, REGULATION: THE CATO REV.
OFBus. & GovTr, Winter 1994, httpJ/www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl7nl-jeffreys.html.
18 7 Id. See also Yandle, supra note 57, at 33 (arguing that CERCLA "taxes, like the income
taxes paid by ordinary citizens, have nothing whatsoever to do with the behavior that
creates the Superfund site").
" A. Myrick Freeman III, Economics, Incentives, and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 212 (Norman J. Vig
& Michael E. Kraft eds., 2003) ("The pollution tax (or charge) strategy has long appealed
to economists because it provides a sure and graduated incentive to firms by making
pollution itself a cost of production.").189 WARD & DUFFIELD, supra note 178, at 242.
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cost in the form of a proposed national sales tax on further development
in high-risk areas and they would pass such costs to the ultimate pur-
chasers themselves rather than the average U.S. taxpayer.
C. Examples of Incentive Based Approaches in Other Contexts
A taxation scheme tied directly to the offending conduct is not a
novel development in government regulation. Known as a "Pigouvian tax,"
this mechanism is "a] standard solution" whereby a tax is levied at a "tax
rate equal to the cost imposed by the external diseconomy."9 ' Accordingly,
this Note proposes the creation of a bipartisan, Congressionally-appointed
panel of economists to collectively determine the proper rate of taxation
for high-risk coastal development so as to accomplish the stated Super-
fund goal of restoring the costs of this development to the parties respon-
sible for its unchecked proliferation while at the same time providing a
stronger deterrent to such unfettered growth.191
Similar taxation schemes have proven successful in a variety of
regulatory contexts. For instance, in Singapore, the government has
implemented a series of taxes on commuters in order to "reduce urban
motor vehicle congestion,"'92 thereby linking these fees directly to the
offending conduct so as to apportion responsibility for the problem on
drivers themselves. Similarly, "[m] any states have become increasingly
reliant on emissions or waste fees to provide both an economic disincentive
to environmental degradation and a source of funds for program manage-
ment."'93 Likewise, as discussed supra, some local governments have im-
plemented a series of "impact fees"'94 tied directly to growth, but have not
gone as far as this Note's proposal in addressing the environmental impact
of high-risk coastal development. Further, even if some local governments
were to successfully address the problem in a similar fashion, there is
still the need for a uniform, national solution due to the overwhelming
tendency of state and local environmental standards to "vary widely."195
'
90 Id. at 226.
191 Kopp & Smith, supra note 177, at 28-29.
192 WARD & DUFFIELD, supra note 178, at 228.
193 Rabe, supra note 121, at 39.
'94 Smith, supra note 163, at 49.
195 NORDSTROM, supra note 50, at 194.
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D. The Last Step: Identifying Countervailing Programs
To successfully implement this Note's equitable taxation scheme,
legislators must heed the advice of a great number of commentators who
have called for the initiation of an "intensive, intergovernmental research
effort... to identify federal, state, and local public policies that directly
or indirectly promote growth and development that increase the vul-
nerability of communities to coastal disasters."196 If the government were
to overlook such policies, the disincentives built into the new scheme
could lose their effectiveness because counterbalancing incentive pro-
grams elsewhere could mitigate the desired punitive effect. Additionally,
it would be wise to identify any entrenched interests, such as the con-
struction industry, 197 that will likely engage in increased lobbying efforts
in an attempt to preserve the current publicly-subsidized "cycle of repair
and reconstruction."198
VIII. RECOGNIZING THE PROPOSAL'S LIMITATIONS
As this Note has articulated, the Superfund system currently covers
only a small number of environmentally hazardous sites.199 Although an
expansion of its coverage and a new funding mechanism is a step in the
right direction, it is impractical to think that a successful expansion of
the Fund would be sufficient to solve all of the problems associated with
natural disaster cleanup efforts. The Superfund may very well be an in-
effective solution for dealing with the environmental cleanup costs of the
average homeowner. Indeed, such an individual is even potentially liable
for a variety of costs wrought by natural disasters. °° As such, the federal
government must focus greater attention on environmental concerns aris-
ing from natural disasters2 1 rather than simply seeking to restore home-
owners financially. The current government response directed towards
the average homeowner is arguably inadequate for both advising and
assisting homeowners in assessing environmental damage for potential
19 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR Sci., ECON. & THE ENV'T, supra note 2, at xxvii.
"I BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 169 ("The construction industry
prospers in the post-storm rush to rebuild.").
198 Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 342.
' See Reitze, supra note 65, at 368.
200 N.C. State University Website, Agricultural and Resource Economics, http://www
.ag-econ.ncsu.eduflsabelfacts.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) (noting that "improper
treatment of hazardous wastes after floods may result in liability to the landowner").
201 See H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENv'T, supra note 2, at 83, 93.
20071
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
health, economic, and legal risks. °2 Greater efforts must be made to assist
those individuals who are adversely affected by natural disasters through
no fault of their own.
The continuing theme of this Note is that a measured approach by
the government should not be devoid of all references to personal respon-
sibility. Just as this Note's proposed Superfund expansion is aimed at re-
turning some semblance of responsibility based upon common tort notions
of reasonableness and foreseeability, so too should federal law be aimed
at fairly apportioning disaster-related cleanup costs. California can be re-
garded as one of the leaders in such an effort, as it has sought to impose a
reasonable care standard of liability in landslide and surface water cases." 3
A variety of other salient issues arise with the realization that the
Superfund cannot extend to every situation involving natural disasters.
While CERCLA has been known to restrict a landowner's right to abandon
or transfer an interest in polluted land, °4 the common law has tradition-
ally favored the free transferability and alienability of real property.0 5
"Many courts refused to impose restrictions on a trustee's right to abandon
property, regardless of the level of environmental contamination present
at such property."2 6 Abandonment thus provides a significant obstacle to
the successful realization of a full and fair environmental cleanup effort.
While the goal should be to inevitably restore a certain level of personal
responsibility in cleanup efforts, we must be wary of neglecting those with
legitimate needs sustained through little or no fault of their own. The objec-
tive is to find a balance between exacerbating the moral hazard problem 27
associated with the reckless, unfettered development of environmentally-
sensitive coastal regions and cutting off important sources of relief to the
detriment of private homeowners, local communities, and the nation at
2
1
2 See, e.g., Poll: Katrina Response Inadequate (Sept. 8, 2005), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2005/09/08/opinion/polls/main824591.shtml. See also Whoriskey, supra note 42
("Raising a house can cost upwards of $50,000... The federal government offers grants
of as much as $30,000 for repairs, but in many cases more is required.").
2
. See generally Robert B. Olshansky & J. David Rogers, The Concept of "Reasonable Care"
on Unstable Hillsides, Anaheim Hills Landslide Update Website (1996), http://anaheim-
landslide.com/care.htm.
204 See Reitze, supra note 65, at 425.
205 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Douglass, 89 Tenn. 219, 222 (1890) ("The law favors free alien-
ation of property and abhors perpetuities.").
20 Harvey R. Miller et al., Issues Affecting Secured Creditors Regarding Environmental
Matters in Bankruptcy Cases, in DEALING WITH SECURED CLAIMS AND STRUCTURED
FINANCIAL PRODUCTS IN BANKRUPTCY CASES 309 (2002).207 See O'Toole, supra note 13.
922 [Vol. 31:893
RESTORING RESPONSIBILITY IN DISASTER RELIEF
large. 2°" Luckily, courts typically restrict abandonment in cases where
there is "'imminent and identifiable' environmental harm [,] and have not
allowed violations of state environmental laws to be a barrier to abandon-
ment where no immediate health risk was presented by the abandonment."2°
This balanced, measured approach to the delicate issue of abandonment
thus appears to be a good compromise.
With this in mind, the government should be prepared in the after-
math of Hurricane Katrina for a greater number of private homeowners
and businesses to abandon polluted property due to a severe lack of the
economic means to properly address the problem.21 ° Consequently, the
government should encourage the efforts of environmental groups, who
have the capital to engender a positive transformation, to acquire polluted
land,211 even to the point of exercising eminent domain 212 and encouraging
relocation 213 in situations where no other alternatives present themselves.
In addition, the government should use all available means at their dis-
posal, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), while
simultaneously recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of each measure.
The "RCRA focuses only on active and future facilities and does not address
abandoned or historical sites. 21 4 With a coordinated, consistent, and measur-
ed effort, the government can effectively deal with the impending crisis.
CONCLUSION
The current federal measures aimed at tackling the detrimental
effects of natural disasters in the United States have created a network
of patchwork solutions that, although well-intentioned, are sometimes
20" BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 94 ("Eroding beaches, removed dunes,
disappearing forest cover, beach nourishment projects, and failing seawalls are examples
of community problems that all individual property owners pay for, whether or not their
property is directly involved.").209 Id. at 335.
210 Rikoon, supra note 8.
211 For an in depth discussion of such efforts by environmental groups, see Feldman, supra
note 17, at 320.
212 See generally Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 351 (discussing government "flood hazard
mitigation technique[s]").
213 BUSH ET AL., EDGE OF THE GULF, supra note 41, at 283.
214 Environmental Protection Agency, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, http://
www.epa.gov/region5/defs/html/rcra.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
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inefficient, 215 wasteful,216 and even counterproductive. 217 Too often the
political response has been characterized by emotional zeal rather than
a cautious, rational, and detached approach that is necessary for the cre-
ation of lasting and truly effective solutions. Even more troubling is the
fact that those commentators brave enough to challenge the firmly estab-
lished federally subsidized "cycle of repair and reconstruction,"2 8 have been
met with disdain and contempt at their perceived lack of compassion.1 9
To combat the moral hazard problem 22° arising from such a system,
it is necessary to forge a thoughtful balance between compassion and rea-
son in an attempt to both tackle the problem of federally insuring reckless
coastal development 21 and still legitimately help those individuals beset
by truly unforeseeable natural disasters.
The first way in which such a balance can be attained is to expand
the current Superfund system to cover overzealous coastal construction
projects that not only put the lives and property of an increasing num-
ber 22 of citizens at risk, but also endanger large environmentally-sensitive
areas. 2 3 But the Superfund is already overextended and undercapitalized,
and it is likely that private land in residential neighborhoods will be over-
looked without an increase in both the scope and funding of the program.
This increase in scope can be realized by reevaluating the term "natural
disaster" and restricting the "act of God" defense embedded in the legis-
lation to cover only those events associated with wholly natural disasters
that are truly unforeseeable. In so doing, this change will ensure that
heretofore unchecked developers can no longer take a "'head in the sand'
attitude"224 towards unwise coastal development.
Likewise, the greater funding needs of the program could be met
through a national sales tax on coastal developments in certain areas
specifically enumerated by the EPA,225 such as those in floodplains and
other environmentally sensitive or inherently dangerous areas across
215 Sar, supra note 47, at 145.
216 O'Toole, supra note 13 (discussing problems of "abuse and waste" in recent disaster
relief efforts).
217 See generally BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 4.
21" Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 342.
2 9 See generally Weatherproofing the U.S. Hearing, supra note 1.
220 O'Toole, supra note 13.
221 See generally BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 4.
222 Verrengia, supra note 19.
223 BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 94.
224 id.
225 See THIS IS FEMA, supra note 173.
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the country.226 The new taxation scheme should be implemented by a bi-
partisan, Congressionally-appointed panel of economists whose task will
be to collectively determine the proper rate of taxation for high-risk coastal
development so as to be consistent with the overall goals and founding
principles that underlie the existing Superfund scheme.227 The new fee,
a standard "Pigouvian tax,"228 will be directly tied to the offending conduct
in order to restore some semblance of accountability and personal respon-
sibility for the problems associated with unchecked coastal development.
The proposed scheme will be supplemented with a firm national
commitment to enforce existing environmental laws such as the manda-
tory provisions of the NFIP, as well as greater federal support for inno-
vative state and local environmental initiatives. This measured political
response will be bolstered by greater public awareness campaigns regard-
ing the "cycle of repair and reconstruction,"229 and a comprehensive federal
research effort to identify and eliminate government policies that might
hinder the overall effectiveness of the proposed tax scheme.23 °
A multifaceted approach could mitigate the problems associated
with rising costs, more frequent and more intense natural disasters, and
limited availability of funds and government programs to deal with envi-
ronmental clean-up costs. The strengthening of the Superfund, coupled
with alternative proposals such as the exercise of eminent domain for
the private211 or public232 acquisition of polluted or abandoned lands, could
create a comprehensive, highly effective solution to tackling the nation's
growing natural disaster-related cleanup concerns.
226 See BUSH ET AL., RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 9, at 46.
227 Kopp & Smith, supra note 177, at 28-29.
228 WARD & DUFFIELD, supra note 178, at 226.
229 Barnhizer, supra note 14, at 342.
230 H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR Sci., ECON. & THE ENV't, supra note 2, at xxvii (proposing
such a comprehensive federal effort).
23' For an in depth discussion of such efforts by environmental groups, see Feldman, supra
note 17, at 320.
232 Cobb, supra note 100.
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